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THE 


MEXICAN  SITUATION 


FROM  A 


MEXICAN   POINT 
OF  VIEW 


LUIS  CABRERA 


WASHINGTON,  D,  C,   1913 


THE 


MEXICAN  SITUATION 


FROM  A 


MEXICAN  POINT 
OF  VIEW 


LUIS  CABRERA 


THE  MEXICAN   SITUATION   FROM  A  MEXICAN 
POINT  OF  VIEW 


MUCH  has  been  said  in  the  United  States  about  the  Mexican 
situation,  but  actual  conditions  in  Mexico  have  never  been 
fully  understood,  because  they  have  always  been  examined 
from  an  American  point  of  view. 

The  sources  from  which  Americans  draw  their  information  about 
Mexico  are  chiefly  foreign  residents  and  investors,  who  are  very 
apt  to  consider  the  Mexican  situation  only  from  the  standpoint  oi 
their  own  interests.  All  that  foreigners  seek  in  Mexico  is  the 
re-establishment  of  a  state  of  things  favoring  the  continuation  and 
promotion  of  business.  They  generally  believe  that  the  conditions 
of  Mexicans  themselves  and  those  issues  of  -a  purely  national  char- 
acter do  not  concern  them,  and  consequently  they  do  not  regard 
them  as  necessary  factors  in  the  problem  as  they  understand  it. 
Hence  it  is  that  the  solutions  suggested,  although  beneficial  per- 
haps to  foreign  interests,  do  not  tend  to  solve  the  Mexican  problem 
itself. 

To  fully  understand  the  Mexican  situation  and  to  find  a  solution 
satisfactory  both  to  Mexican  and  foreign  interests  it  is  necessary  to 
review  the  question  from  a  Mexican  point  of  view. 

Such  is  the  purpose  of  this  memorandum. 

THE  RULE  OF  THE   IRON    HAND 

The  majority  of  foreigners  in  Mexico  believe  that  the  only  politi- 
cal problem  which  interests  them  is  peace.  But,  misled  by  super- 
ficial judgment  or  inspired  by  impatience,  they  have  believed  that 
the  establishment  of  peace  depends  only  -on  the  energy  with  which 
the  country  is  governed.  All  foreigners  in  Mexico  look  for  a 
rigorous  government,  an  iron  hand  or  a  mailed  fist,  and  the  only 
thing  they  discuss  is  whether  a  certain  man  is  sufficiently  "strong" 
to  control  the  country.  And  when  they  find  a  man  with  such 
qualities,  foreigners  .always  have  believed  that  it  was  their  duty 
to  help  that  man  to  come  into  power  and  to  support  him. 


105*153 


These  were  the  reasons  for  foreign  sympathy  in  favor  of  General 
Reyes  first,  General*  Felix  Diaz  afterward,  "and  then  General  Huerta; 
and  these  are  the  reasons  why  President  Madero  did  not  get  full 
support  of  the  foreign  element.  He  was  considered  a  weak  man, 
and  consequently  unable  to  maintain  peace. 

It  is  necessary  to  rectify  foreign  opinion  relative  to  strong 
Government  in  Mexico.  - 

A  strong  Government  is  not  one  able  to  maintain  peace  by  the 
mere  force  of  arms,  but  the  one  that  can  obtain  the  support  of  the 
majority  of  the  citizens  of  the  country.  Any  peace  obtained  by  the 
iron-hand  method  is  only  a  temporary  peace.  Permanent  peace 
in  Mexico  must  be  based  on  certain  economical,  political  and 
social  conditions  which  would  automatically  result  in  a  stable 
equilibrium  between  the  higher  and  the  lower  classes  of  the  nation. 

Foreigners  should  be  persuaded  that  to  possess  real  guarantees 
for  their  interests  it  is  an  essential  that  such  interests  be  based  on 
the  welfare  of  the  people  of  Mexico. 

It  is,  then,  to  the  interest  of  foreign  capitalists  to  help  Mexicans 
to  obtain  such  conditions  as  would  produce  permanent  peace. 


A   REAL  REVOLUTION 

The  troubles  in  Mexico  within  the  last  three  years  are  attributable 
to  maladministration  covering  a  period  of  thirty  years.  The 
internal  upheaval  could  not  have  reached  the  present  state  had  mere 
personal  ambition  been  the  motive.  The  revolution  in  Mexico  could 
not  be  as  strong  as  it  is  to-day  were  robbery  the  only  purpose  of 
the  soldiers,  or  were  personal  ambition  the  sole  incentive  of  the 
leaders. 

The  truth  is  that  the  Mexican  disturbances  constitute  a  real 
revolution,  of  apparently  political  aspect,  but  at  the  very  bottom  are 
of  economic  and  social  character.  The  present  revolution  is  only  the 
continuation  of  the  revolution  begun  in  1910. 

The  present  revolution's  main  purpose  is  to  free  the  lower  classes 
from  the  condition  of  near-slavery  in  which  they  have  been  held 
and  to  seek  an  improvement  in  their  economic  and  social  conditions. 

In  Mexico  the  middle  class  is  in  a  formative  stage.  One  of  the 
results  of  the  present  revolution  will  be  to  help  create  such  a 
class,  thus  preserving  a  social  equilibrium  in  the  country.  Where 
there  is  no  social  equilibrium,  there  is  no  lasting  peace;  and  there 
is  no  democratic  form  of  Government  without  a  middle  class. 

The  Mexican  situation  has  three  principal  aspects — social,  eco- 
nomical, and 'political. 


SOCIAL    ASPECT 

Mexico  has  a  population  of  15,000,000  souls,  15  per  cent  of 
which  are  Indians,  75  per  cent  mixed,  or  mestizos,  and  10  per 
cent  of  the  white  race.  Mexico,  however,  has  no  real  race  question 
to  solve.  Indians  and  Mestizos  mix  easily  with  people  of  European 
nationality.  The  really  important  question  arises  from  the  dif- 
ferent races  forming  the  population  of  Mexico,  since  we  have  the 
different  stages  of  civilization  of  the  different  types  of  people.  It 
is  hard  to  find  a  Government  formula  to  rule  people  of  fifteenth, 
eighteenth  and. twentieth  century  stages  of  civilization.  The  auto- 
cratic dictatorship  which  might  suit  the  Indian  population  is  entirely 
unfitted  for  European  residents,  and  the  democratic  rule  acceptable 
by  foreign  residents  or  by  highly  educated  Mexicans  would  never 
suit  the  large  percentage  of  the  illiterate  classes. 

ECONOMIC     CAUSES     OF     THE     MEXICAN     REVOLUTION 

The  Mexican  problems  have  been  and  still  are  chiefly  economic. 
The  colonial  policies  of  Spain  in  Mexico  contributed  in1  a  large 
measure  to  create  privileged  classes.  Large  tracts  of  land  were 
granted  to  settlers  or  conquerors  and  to  the  Church,  and  thousands 
of  Indians  were  compelled  to  live  upon  the  tracts  of  the  land  so 
granted.  The  Indian  was  kept  practically!  in  a  state  of  slavery. 
The  independence  in  1810  did  not  materially  change  the  condition 
of  the  masses.  After  the  religious  struggles  in  1860,  the  Church 
lost  its  property,  but  great  land  areas  owned  by  wealthy  families 
still  remained  as  mainmort,  and  are  at  present  responsible  for 
Mexico's  crisis. 

The  communal  lands  formerly  owned  by  the  towns,  and  which 
were  called  egidos,  were,  since  about  1860,  divided  and  apportioned 
among  the  inhabitants  for  the  purpose  of  creating  small  agricul- 
tural properties,  but  through  ignorance  those  lands  were  almost 
immediately  resold  to  the  large  land  owners  whose  properties  were 
adjacent.  This  resulted  in  strengthening  the  oppressive  monopoly 
exercised  by  the  large  land  owners,  as  the  small  properties  were 
_ unable  to  withstand  the  competition. 

From  1880  conditions  in  Mexico  began  to  be  complicated,  by 
reason  of  the  policies  of  General  Porfirio  Diaz  for  the  development 
of  the  country.  General  Diaz  thought  that  the  best  way  to  develop 
the  resources  of  Mexico  was  to  favor  the  establishment  of  large 
business  enterprises  and  the  formation  of  large  corporations,  to 
"fhich  special  advantages  were  offered.  He  granted  large  conces- 
sions in  lands,  mines,  railroads,  industrial  and  banking  institutions, 


to  foreign  investors,  thus  creating  enormous  monopolies  and  making 
more  accentuated  the  contrast  between  the  rich  and  the  labobring 
classes  of  the  nation.  The  cost  of  living  was  raised  by  the  increase/ 
of  capital.  The  wages  of  miners,  railroad  men  and  those  of  the 
industrial  classes  were  somewhat  increased,  although  not  in  pro- 
portion to  the  increased  high  cost  of  living.  The  wages  of  the 
rural  laborer  did  not  enjoy  this  increase,  the  income  of  the  peon 
still  remaining  at  a  ridiculously  low  average.  Notwithstanding  the 
low  rate  of  agricultural  wages,  the  great  land  owners  were  still 
able  to  obtain  labor,  thanks  to  their  political  influence,  which 
allowed  them  to  keep  the  peons  in  practical  slavery. 

Farming  on  a  small  scale  has  not  been  developed  in  Mexico  on 
account  of  unfavorable  conditions  for  the  small  land  holders.  The 
large  estates,  called  haciendas,  pay  only  about  10  per  cent  of  the 
taxes  levied  by  law,  as  a  result  of  misrepresenting  the  value  of  the 
property,  while  the  small  land  holder  is  obliged  to  pay  the  whole 
tax  imposed,  as  he  is  unable  to  successfully  misrepresent  the  value 
of  his  minor  holdings,  and  as  he  lacks  the  political  influence  to 
obtain  a  reduction. 

The  unrest  produced  by  these  economic  conditions,  although  not 
clearly  understood,  was  largely  responsible  for  the  demand  for  a 
change,  which  was  so  apparent  at  the  close  of  General  Dia:'s 
administration.  This  economic  aspect  of  the  Mexican  situation  was 
complicated  by  political  problems  which  at  that  time  began  to  be 
raised. 

POLITICAL     ASPECT 

The  Mexican  Constitution  was  largely  patterned  after  the  French' 
and  the  American  constitutions.  Since  the  time  of  its  promulga- 
tion, in  1857,  first  on  account  of  the  reform  war,  then  because  01 
the  French  intervention,  and  lately  owing  to  the  personal  dictator- 
ship of  General  Diaz,  the  people  of  Mexico  have  not  had  an  oppor- 
tunity to  test  their  Constitution.  It  never  was-  put  into  effect. 
Study  and  recent  developments,  however,  have  proved  that  in 
certain  particulars  the  Constitution  of  Mexico  is  not  fitted  to  the 
needs  of  the  people. 

THE     CONSTITUTIONALIST     TENDENCIES 

Any  party  wishing  to  establish  peace  in   Mexico  must  take   in 
consideration  these  three  aspects  of  the  Mexican  situation.     The] 
Constitutionalist  party  wishes  to  solve  the  social  problem  of  Mexico . 
by   fostering   education,   so   as   to  level   the   barriers   between   the', 
upper  and  lower  classes  as  soon  as  possible.     The  Constitutionalist 
party  wishes  to  improve  the  conditions  of  the  lower  classes,  so  as 


to  begin  the  creation  of  a  middle  class.  In  political  matters  the 
Constitutionalist  party  wishes  the  Government  of  Mexico  to  abide 
by  the  Constitution,  but  at  the  same  time  advocates  its  reformation 
so  as  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  country. 

EARLY     SYMPTOMS 

Since  1895  there  has  been  a  feeling  of  unrest  in  Mexico,  which 
made  itself  more  apparent  during  the  last  years  of  General  Diaz's 
government.  This  feeling  of  restlessness  was  not  well  defined,  and 
even  when  it  led  to  several  armed  movements  after  1905  it  was 
generally  thought  that  they  were  only  insurrections  of  a  local  char- 
acter or  mere  riots.  When  in  1908  General  Diaz  announced  in  the 
;famous  Creelman  interview  that  he  was  ready  to  retire,  public 
opinion  in  Mexico  was  profoundly  stirred.  Two  opposite  tendencies 
appeared — one  instigated  by  the  friends  of  General  Diaz,  which 
demanded  his  re-election  or  the  election  of  a  man  who  would  con- 
tinue his  policies,  and  the  other  which  wished  a  change  in  the 
Government  and  in  the  system. 

It  was  at  that  time  when  Don  Francisco  I.  Madero  organized  the 
anti-re-election  party  and  when  he  began  his  electoral  campaign 
under  the  motto,  "Effective  suffrage  and  no  re-election.''  It  was 
supposed  that  the  best  remedy  for  the  Mexican  situation  would  be 
a  free  election  of  a  President  and  the  enactment  of  a  law  limiting 
his  tenure  to  one  term.  The  political  problem  seemed  to  be  the 
most  important  of  all  questions,  and  it  absorbed  entirely  the  public's 
attention,  so  that  the  economic  and  social  problems  were  lost  sight  of. 

General  Diaz  accepted  very  easily  his  last  re-election,  and  per- 
mitted to  be  named  with  him  as  Vice  President  Ramon  Corral,  who 
represented  the  perpetuation  of  the  old  regime.  No  other  candidates 
than  Diaz  and  Corral  were  admitted.  Madero  was  arrested  before 
the  elections,  and  the  triumph  of  the  Diaz-Corral  ticket  made 
apparent  the  impossibility  of  obtaining  a  political  change  by  ballot. 

MADERO  *S     REVOLUTION 

On  his  escape  from  prison,  Francisco  I.  Madero  started  the 
revolution.  The  Plan  of  San  Luis  Potosi,  which  was  the  basis  of 
the  movement,  made  it  clear  that  the  leaders  still  considered  as  the 
chief  problem  of  Mexico  a  political  change,  and  the  purpose  of 
that  plan  was  chiefly  a  change  of  government. 

The  rural  classes,  however,  followed  Madero  and  supported  him 
in  the  revolution  initiated  by  him  under  the  tacit  belief  that  his 
revolution  would  bring  agrarian  reforms  which  were  needed  to 
improve  the  condition  of  the  masses,  but  which  were  not  yet 
enunciated  in  anv  concrete  form. 


7 

General  Diaz  believed  that  he  would  stop  the  revolution  by  his 
retiring  from  power.  The  negotiations  at  Juarez,  by  which  General 
Diaz  agreed  to  retire  and  to  deliver  the  government  to  a  provi- 
sional President — the  person  selected  by  virtue  of  that  agreement 
was  Francisco  L.  de  la  Barra — checked  the  revolution  precisely 
when  it  began  to  acquire  its  actual  strength  and  real  form. 

DE   LA    BARRA 

De  la  Barra — a  vacillating  and  Jesuitic  character — had  no  forma- 
tive policy  during  his  administration.  As  a  creature  of  General 
Diaz,  intimately  connected  with  the  conservative  element  of  the  old 
regime,  he  merely  limited  himself  to  muster  out  the  revolutionary 
army,  as  the  way  in  which  he  understood  peace  ought  to  be  re- 
established. 

By  this  negative  action  he  minimized  the  effect  of  the  revolution 
and  he  prepared  a  reaction  in  favor  of  the  old  regime.  The  same 
men  who  surrounded  General  Diaz  and  who  had  urged  the  con- 
tinuation of  his  policies  returned  to  the  country  when  they  saw 
that  they  were  not  to  be  persecuted,  and  started  a  political  cam- 
paign against  Madero  and  against  the  policies  of  the  revolution. 
It  was  during  this  period  that  efforts  were1  made  to  concentrate 
public  opinion  in  favor  of  General  Reyes  and  De  la  Barra  himself 
as  Presidential  candidates  against  Madero. 

It  was  at  this  same  time  that  the  clerical  party,  which  since  l867\ 
had  shown  no  signs  of  life,  was1  revived  under  the  name  of  the 
Catholic  party,  and  clearly  showed  that  it  favored  the  reactionary   / 
principles  of  the  Diaz  regime. 

De  la  Barra's  interim  administration  can  be  summed  up  by  say- 
ing that  while  he  received  the  government  in  trust,  to  be  turned 
over  to  the  Revolution,  he  did  everything  in  his  power  to  keep  'it 
for  himself  and  to  avoid  the  advent  of  the  new  regime,  thus  show- 
ing disloyalty  both  to  Madero  personally  and  to  the  revolution 
itself. 

CAUSES   OF    MADERO'S   FAILURE 

When  Madero  came  into  power,  in  November,  1911,  he  found 
the  government  in  such  condition  that  he  was  unable  to  change  its 
direction,  and  was  forced  to  accept  existing  conditions  and  even 
the  same  Cabinet  appointed  by  De,  la  Barra,  in  which  the  most 
influential  part  was  played  by  Ministers  Calero,  Hernandez  and 
Ernesto  Madero. 


Surrounded  by  nearly  all  the  Diaz  people,  Madero  could  not 
establish  a  reform  policy.  During  all  the  time  of  his  government 
he  was  constantly  called  by  two  opposite  tendencies — on  one  side 
the  reactionary  in  favor  of  the  Diaz  regime,  and  on  the  other  side 
the  revolutionary. 

***  Madero  tried  to   make   friends   out  of  the   Diaz  partisans,   but 
*  unsuccessfully.    At  the  same  time  he  lost  the  support  of  the  greater 
part  of  the  men  who  had  helped  him  during  the  revolution. 

At  the  very  beginning  of  Madero's  administration  a  protesting 
movement  started,  which  was  backed  by  some  of  the  old  regime. 
The  insurrections  of  Pascual  Orozco  and  of  General  Bernardo  Reyes 
were  not  more  than  attempts  of  reaction  against  the  1910  revolu- 
tion. The  insurrection  of  Felix  Diaz,  in  the  month  of  September, 

1912,  demonstrated  that  the  reactionary  sentiment  had  acquired  a 
great  importance,  and  that  the  army,  which  was  the  same  army  left 
by  General  Porfirio  Diaz,  was  not  in  sympathy  with  the  revolution 
nor  with  Madero  personally. 

A     REACTIONARY      MOVEMENT 

The  insurrection  of  La  Ciudadela  in  Mexico  City,  in  February, 

1913,  gave   the  opportunity  to   General   Huerta  of  becoming  the 
chief   of    the    reactionary   movement    against    the   government   of 
Madero. 

General  Victoriano  Huerta,  who  had  been  one  of  the  military 
chiefs  of  Diaz,  had  lent  important  services  to  President  Madero  by 
suppressing  the  revolution  started  by  Orozco  at  Chihuahua.  The 
prestige  acquired  by  General  Huerta  after  his  triumph  against 
Orozco  began  to  be  used  by  the  enemies  of  Madero,  who  suc- 
ceeded in  convincing  General  Huerta  of  his  personal  strength  and 
of.  his  being  the  only  support  that  Madero  had. 

During  the  tragic  ten  days  in  Mexico,  General  Huerta  did  not 
really  attempt  to  overcome  Felix  Diaz.  He  understood  that  the 
fate  of  the  government  was  in  his  hands,  and  he  stood  in  a  supine 
attitude  until  the  last  moment,  when  the  pressure  of  foreigners  and 
diplomats  in  Mexico  City  gave  him  an  excuse  to  execute  his  coup 
d'etat. 

The  assassination  of  Madero  and  Pino  Suarez  was  considered  a 
practical  way  of  removing  obstacles  to  the  political  success  of  the 
new  government.  Huerta  believed  by  the  removal  of  the  President 
and  Vice  President  he  was  practically  without  enemies,  and  that 
some  time  must  pass  before  the  revolutionary  elements  could  con- 
centrate on  a  new  leader.  In  this  he  was  mistaken. 


9 

RESUMPTION     OF     THE     STRUGGLE 

During  Madero's  government  the  position  of  the  revolutionary 
element  was  uncertain  and  awkward,  because,  while  they  were 
supposed  to  be  exercising  a  great  political  influence  through 
Madero,  practically  they  had  no  influence  whatever,  since  the 
Madero  government  was  almost  controlled  by  the  conservative 
Cabinet. 

After  the  death  of  President  Madero  the  position  of  the  revolu- 
tionary elements  became  clear.  During  his  life,  for  reasons  of 
loyalty  and  hope  of  a  change,  they  had  never  taken  an  aggressive 
attitude  against  him,  but  once  the  President  was  dead  and  nothing 
to  be  hoped  for  from  Huerta,  there  was  no  difficulty  in  renewing 
the  struggle. 

Huerta  represented  the  reaction,  and  his  government  was  no 
more  than  the  restoration  of  the  government  of  General  Diaz,  with 
its  same  proceedings  and  the  same  men  under  the  orders  of  another 
chief.  The  revolution  against  Huerta  is  no  more  than  the  same 
revolution  started  in  1910  by  Madero,  and  which,  having  been 
checked  in  1911  by  virtue  of  the  negotiations  of  Juarez  and  the 
election  of  Madero,  now  continued  and  entered  into  full  activity, 
augmented  because  of  the  revolting  circumstances  under  which  the 
fall  of  Madero  had  taken  place.  The  death  of  Madero  has  been 
one  of  the  most  powerful  sentimental  factors  to  increase  the  revo- 
lutionary movement  against  Huerta. 

AIMS    OF    THE    REVOLUTION 

It  has  been  very  widely  stated  that  the  Carranza  movement  has 
only  the  purpose  of  avenging  the  death  of  Madero  and  reinstating 
the  office  holders  appointed  by  him.  This  is  not  the  case.  The 
purposes  of  the  Constitutionalists  are  higher  and  better  defined 
than  were  the  motives  of  the  1910  movement.  The  Constitutional- 
ists propose  the  re-establishment  of  a  Constitutional  government 
'in  Mexico,  but  as  they  realize  the  unfitness  of  the  Mexican  Con- 
stitution and  other  laws,  they  intend  to  reform  them  in  order  to 
have  a  system  fitted  to  the  country. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  peace  in  Mexico  cannot  be  established 
unless  a  complete  change  takes  place  in  the  Government's  personnel 
and  in  the  systems  and  laws.  This  is  the  reason  that  the  Constitu- 
tionalists, appear  too  radical  to  those  who  would  like  to  find  a  way 
of  pacifying  Mexico  at  once. 

The  Constitutionalists  mean  to  begin  immediately  such  economic 
reforms,  and  especially  such  agrarian  reforms  as  are  necessary  to_ 


10 

offer  to  the  lower  classes  an  opportunity  of  improving  their  condi- 
tion ;  division  of  large  estates ;  equalization  of  taxation,  and,  in 
places  where  it  would  be  necessary,  the  re-establishment  of  the 
egidos  or  communal  land  system. 

THE     LEADERS 

Doubts  have  been  raised  as  to  the  ability  of  the  men  leading  the 
Revolution  to  carry  out  those  reforms  and  to  reorganize  the  Gov- 
ernment and  pacify  the  country.  Such  doubts  refer  even  to  the 
supposed  inability  of  the  leaders  to  overthrow  Huerta  and  to  main- 
tain control  of  the  Revolutionary  groups.  Carranza  and  the  men 
who  are  helping  him  have  always  been  described  as  mere  bandits 
in  Mexican  and  foreign  papers. 

This  is  very  far  from  the  truth. 

A  glance  at  Carranza  and  the  men  around  him,  and  comparing 
them  with  General  Huerta  and  his  associates,  makes  it  clear  that 
there  is  a  vast  difference  between  the  two,  the  result  being  in  favor 
of  Carranza  and  against  Huerta. 

Huerta  is  well  known  at  present.  His  moral  standard,  his  educa- 
tion, and  his  ability  as  a  statesman  are  nil.  His  success  and  his 
political  strength  came  from  the  support  that  he  received  from  the 
conservative  elements.  At"  the  beginning  of  his  government — with 
the  Cabinet  imposed  to  him  by  the  men  of  "La  Ciudadela" — it 
seemed  that  he  tried  to  surround  himself  with  intelligent  and  honest 
people ;  but  lately  his  Cabinet  has  been  formed  of  most  undesirable 
men,  like  Moheno,  Blanquet  and  Lozano. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Constitutionalist  movement  Carranza 
found  it  difficult  to  obtain  the  co-operation  of  well-known  men. 
But  time  brought  changes.  At  present  his  Cabinet  is  formed  by 
Licenciado  Francisco  Escudero,  a  prominent  lawyer  of  the  State  of 
Jalisco,  formerly  Speaker  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  a 
man  of  great  culture ;  Licenciado  Rafael  Zubaran,  a  very  intelligent, 
straightforward  and  able  lawyer  of  the  State  of  Campeche ;  Ing. 
Ignacio  Bonillas,  a  graduate  of  the  Massachusetts  School  of  Teeh- 
nology,  of  Boston,  and  General  Felipe  Angeles,  a  technical  militarv 
man,  formerly  Director  of  the  Military  School  in  Chapultepec.  The 
high  standing  and  the  ability  of  these  gentlemen  is  far  above  the 
moral  standard  and  ability  of  Huerta  and  his  men. 

The  people  fighting  under  the  orders  of  Carranza,  like  the  above- 
named  gentlemen,  have  been  made  the  object  of  the  most  malicious 
and  unjust  attacks  in  the  Mexican  and  even  in  many  American 
papers,  thus  creating  for  them  such  a  reputation  that  one  not  well 
informed  would  hardly  dare  to  defend  them. 


II 

It  is  eminently  proper  to  say  that  among-  the  military  leaders 
of  the  Revolution  there  are  several  persons  whose  uprightness, 
morals  and  intelligence  are  beyond  discussion. 

General  Pablo  Gonzalez  and  General  Antonio  I.  Villarreal,  in 
the  State  of  Tamaulipas;  General  Jesus  Carranza  and  General 
Lucio  Blanco,  in  Nuevo  Leon  •  General  Maytorena  and  ex-Governor 
Pesqueira,  in  Sonora ;  General  Alvaro  Obregon,  in  Sinaloa ;  General 
Rodriguez  Cabo  and  General  Aguilar,  in  San  Luis  Potosi,  are  among 
them,  whose  conduct  during  the  revolution  has  been  uniformly 
proper  and  just  within  the  rules  of  war. 

OTHER  LEADERS 

Outside  of  these  leaders,  there  are  several  other  men  whom 
the  reading  public  has  been  taught  to  consider  as  bandits, 
absolutely  devoid  of  any  moral  sense,  and  whose  alleged 
atrocities  are  always  charged  to  the  account  of  Carranza.  Most 
of  the  charges  brought  against  them  are  false;  but,  without  enter- 
ing into  details,  there  is  a  single  consideration  with  which  they 
can  be  defended,  namely : 

No  revolution  in  any  country  or  in  history  has  been  made  by  a 
man  choosing  in  anticipation  the  tools  that  he  will  employ  to  over- 
!  throw  a  regime. 

Revolutions  start  spontaneously,  and  in  a  more  or  less  anarchic 
I  way,  and  the  task  of  the  leaders  as  the  movement  progresses  is 
|  largely  one  of  selecting  the  good  and  eliminating  the  bad  and 
Meading  the  movement  in  the  right  channel. 

In  this  matter  Carranza  has  proved  with  facts  that  whatever  may 
have  been  the  nature  of  the  elements  found  by  him  at  the  beginning 
of  the  revolution,  the  character  of  these  elements  has  been  improved 
by  him  daily.  One  can  see  that  there  is  a  large  difference  in  the 
proceedings  of  war  employed  at  the  beginning  and  the  proceedings 
at  the  present  time,  as  the  leaders  have  acquired  more  control  over 
the  soldiers.  As  bad  as  the  atrocities  may  have  been  at  the  begin- 
ning,  the  greater  is  the  merit  of  Carranza  and  the  Revolutionary 
leaders,  as  they  have  proved  it  was  possible  to  continue  the  revolu- 
tion with  the  same  elements  by  improving  the  discipline  of  their 
forces  and  by  creating  a  sense  of  responsibility  in  the  small  leaders, 
thus  bringing  order  out  of  chaos. 

On  the  other  side,  the  military  methods  used  by  Huerta  and  the 
politicians  around  him,  by  his  advisers  and  by  the  military  chiefs 
in  command  of  his  army,  are  not  sufficiently  known  outside  of 
Mexico.  Everybody  would  be  surprised  to  know  that  Htierta's 
methods  in  fighting  the  rebels  are  bloodier  and  more  brutal  than 
those  of  the  Revolutionists. 


12 

The  acceptance  by  Carranza  of  Zapata's  aid  was  considered  as 
the  most  imprudent  act  of  Carranza.  This  acceptance  shows,  how- 
ever, his  cleverness  as  Chief  of  the  Revolution. 

What  is  called  "zapatismo,"  the  agrarian  revolution  in  the 
southern  part  of  Mexico,  exists — and  ought. to  exist — whoever  the 
chief  of  that  revolution  may  be. 

The  ''zapatismo"  is  not  the  result  of  the  will  of  Zapata,  but  a 
special  condition  of  the  region  and  a  peculiar  aspect  of  the  revolu- 
tion in  that  part  of  the  country,  the  result  of  a  special  economic 
situation,  made  more  critical  by  the  form  of  repression  employed 
by  the  Federal  troops. 

Carranza  was  not  free  to  choose  between  Zapata  and  some  other 
leader,  nor  between  the  Zapatistas  and  some  other  army.  He 
was  bound  to  accept,  and  he  did  well  to  accept,  the  ''zapatismo" 
as  the  only  practical  way  of  obtaining  control  of  the  Southern 
revolution,  which  has  been  considered  as  most  chaotic. 

THE  POLICY  OF  NON-RECOGNITION 

President  Wilson's  policy  of  non-recognition  of  the  Huerta 
administration,  based  on  both  the  illegality  and  immorality  of  its 
origin,  is  well  justified.  In  refusing  to  support  a  government  which 
tries  to  continue  a  system  of  personal  government  founded  on 
privileges,  monopolies  and  the  predominance  of  great  interests  over 
the  lower  classes,  he  has  done  right. 

The  results  obtained  by  that  policy  of  non-recognition  have  been 
undoubtedly  very  important,  in  that  they  prevented  the  consolida- 
tion of  Huerta's  rule.  Had  the  United  States  recognized  Huerta, 
he  would  have  acquired  certain  temporal  strength;  and  while  the 
revolution  would  not  have  been  checked  on  that  account,  the 
sacrifice  of  life  and  property  would  have  been  much  more  con- 
siderable and  the  struggle  would  have  been  more  protracted. 

The  natural  impatience  of  European  as  well  as  certain  American 
interests  to  see  peace  re-established  in  Mexico  so  that  they  may 
renew  their  business  activities,  has.  led  the  Washington  administra- 
tion to  believe  that  it  would  be  wise  not  only  to  assume  a  passive 
attitude  toward  Huerta,  but  to  take  some  active  steps  for  the 
purpose  of  eliminating  him.  Those  active  steps,  which  might 
properly  be  called  a  species  of  pacific  intervention,  might  result, 
to  be  sure,  in  the  elimination  of  Huerta,  himself,  and  his  cabinet, 
but  all  the  other  problems  which  the  revolution  proposes  to  solve 
would  be  left  pending. 

TPIE   POLICY  OF  ELIMINATION 

Those  active  steps  of  the  American  Government  to  eliminate 
Huerta,  which  the  American  press  has  been  advocating  in  moments 


13 

when  public  opinion  has  been  greatly  aroused,  has  brought  about 
results  contrary  to  those  which  might  have  been  expected,  afford- 
ing Huerta  a  chance  to  strengthen  himself  and  to  appear  as  the 
champion  of  Mexico's  sovereignty. 

Huerta,  whose  behavior  at  the  time  of. the  murder  of  Madero 
led  him  to  consult  and  discuss  his  coup  d'etat  with  America's 
Ambassador,  is  now,  however,  the  ostensible  defender  of  Mexico's 
sovereignty  against  the  interference  of  the  American  Government. 
This  attitude,  while  not  giving  him  any  new  friends,  has  at  least 
served  to  appease  many  of  his  enemies. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  good  disposition  of  the  American  Govern- 
ment toward  the  Constitutionalists,  or,  at  least,  the  expression  of 
its  sympathy  with  their  ideals,  has  helped  the  Constitutionalist 
cause,  strengthening  it  considerably  in  the  public  mind ;  but  the 
active  steps  taken  to  bring  about  an  understanding  between  the 
Constitutionalists  and  Washington,  through  Dr.  Hale,  as  repre- 
sented by  the  press, -have  tended  to  produce,  in  respect  to  Carranza, 
an  effect  totally  opposite  to  that  which  Lind's  mission  produced 
with  regard  to  Huerta ;  that  is,  the  steps  taken  might  have  con- 
siderably lessened  Carranza's  prestige  before  the  Mexican  public 
had  it  not  been  for  the  straightforwardness  shown  by  the  Constitu- 
tionalist leader  in  making  a  frank  statement  that  he  did  not  desire 
any  actual  assistance  from  the  United  States  or  from  any  other 
foreign  country  in  accomplishing  the  overthrow  of  Huerta.  The 
impatience  felt  in  public  opinion  and  the  desire  on  the  part  of 
President  Wilson  to  carry  out  to  an  end  his  avowed  purpose  of 
eliminating  Huerta,  have  led  to  the  idea  that  an  immediate  solution 
of  the  Mexican  crisis  must  be  had. 

In  fact,  there  is  a  great  desire  to  bring  the  war  to  an  end  as 
[uickly  as  possible  and  to  eliminate  Huerta  at  the  earliest  moment. 
For  that  purpose  various  schemes  have  been  suggested  which, 
>recisely  on  account  of  their  tendency  to  bring  about  quick  results, 
ire  endangering  the  success  of  the  revolution.  Quick  results  of 
this  character  would  signify  only  a  fictitious  and  temporary  peace. 

COMPROMISING 

All  attempts  to  convince  Huerta  and  Carranza  that  they  should 
abandon  their  pretences  and  agree  upon  a  neutral  candidate  who 
would  call  new  elections  are  very  dangerous. 

In  the  present  struggle  in  Mexico  we  find  on  one  side  the  monied 
elements,  deeply  conservative  and  reactionary  and  interested  in 
the  continuation  of  a  regime  that  has  the  hatred  of  the  masses ; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  we  find  the  revolutionary  elements  deeply 


14 

interested  in  the  complete  transformation  of  the  country.     Under 
Jthese  circumstances,  no  possible  compromise  can  "take  place. 

fWe  know,  through  actual  experience  in  Mexico,  that  the  results 
of  compromise  between  the  progressive  and  conservative  parties 
have  always  been  disastrous.  The  administrations  of  Iturbide, 
Cnmonfort  and  De  la  Barra  are  the  three  most  conspicuous  instances 
of  it.  On  each. occasion  a  new  revolution  started  with  greater  vigor 
than  before. 


THE  NEUTRAL   MEN 

A  neutral  man,  equally  acceptable  to  both  sides — if  such  a  man 
could  be  found  in  Mexico — would  have  to  be  either  openly  con- 
servative or  liberal.  In  the  first  case,  the  compromise  would 
amount  to  placing  the  government  of  Mexico  in  the  hands  of  the 
Conservative  party;  but  the  leadership  of  a  man  who,  by  reason 
of  his  honorable  character,  or  his  moral  standing,  or  his  good 
faith  in  promoting  the  conservative  cause,  would  make  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  reforms  desired  by  the  Constitutionalist  party  even  much 
more  difficult.  In  the  second  case — that  is,  if  such  a  man  belonged 
to  the  Liberal  party,  it  can  be  said  in  advance  that  he  would  not 
be  a  man  of  strong  personality  and  he  would  not  have  the  firmness 
of  character  and  intelligence  so  necessary  to  rule  Mexico  at  the 
present  time.  At  the  stage  which  the  Mexican  revolution  now  has 
reached,  the  only  neutral  men  who  remain  in  the  country  are,  in 
fact,  those  who,  through  fear,  lack  of  patriotism,  or  indifference  to 
political  questions,  have  kept  aloof.  All  other  men  of  some  sig- 
nificance who  have  not  mixed  in  politics — and  among  which  a  man, 
perhaps,  could  be  selected  for  that  purpose — are  men  of  great 
financial  resources  and  who  are  intimately  connected  with  the 
conservative  elements  which  now  rule  the  country. 

AN  IMMEDIATE  ELECTION 

A  compromise  between  General  Huerta  and  the  Constitutionalists, 
by  virtue  of  which  Huerta  would  retire  and  Carranza  would  come  in 
power,  would  also  be  very  dangerous  if  it  were  immediately  followed 
by  presidential  elections.  Mexico  has  not  had  a  chance  yet 
to  sufficiently  study  the  present  electoral  laws.  If  the  revolutionary 
government,  once  in  power,  attempted  to  immediately  hold  new 
elections,  great  difficulties  would  at  once  be  encountered,  not  only 
on  account  of  the  present  state  of  war,  but  on  account  of  the  lack 
of  proper  electoral  laws  to  carry  into  effect  a  free  and  fair  election. 


15 

If  the  revolution  were  checked  at  the  present  time,  and  immediate 
elections  called,  the  conservative -element  would  have  a  new  oppor- 
tunity to  win  in  a  farcical  election  by  making  use  of  the  same 
means  that  up  to  the  present  time  they  have  so  successfully  used  in 
the  past. 

THE  RE-ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  MADERO   CABINET 

There  has  been  lately  much  talk  about  solving"  the  political  conflict 
in  Mexico  by  bringing  things  to  the  same  state  in  which  they  were 
upon  the  death  of  Madero — that  is,  by  handing  over  the  situation  to 
Mr.  Lascurain,  or  to  some  other  member  of  that  cabinet,,  and 
annulling  all  the  acts  of  Huerta's  administration  from  that  time. 
This  form  of  solving  the  problem  would  be  impracticable.  Further- 
more, it  would  not  be  a  god  policy  because  it  would  amount  to  a 
mere  restoration  and  a  mere  reactionary  movement  to  put  things 
in  the  state  in  which  they  were  before.  And  the  worst  of  all  is  that 
this  restoration  would  place  the  government  precisely  in  the  hands 
of  those  who  were  the  chief  factors  to  bring  about  the  apparent 
unpopularity  of  President  Madero  among  the  revolutionary  ele- 
ments, and  the  same  o'nes  who  forced  him  to  practically  place  him- 
self in  the  hands  of  the  Conservative  party. 

Mr.  Lascurain  is  an  honorable  man,  but  he  lacks  personality. 
This  he  showed  when  he  delivered  the  resignations  of  the  President 
and  the  Vice  President  before  the  latter  had  been  placed  in  safety. 
Furthermore,  he  is  a  man  of  considerable  means  and  he  is  intimately 
connected  with  the  Catholic  party. 

On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Rafael  Hernandez,,  who  was  Minister  of 
the  Interior  at  the  time  of  Madero's  fall,  is  the  member  of  the 
cabinet  who  was  most  intimately  connected  with  the  financial  ele- 
ments surrounding  General  Diaz  during  the  last  years  of  his 
administration  an/1  was  the  member  of  the  cabinet  who  most 
strongly  opposed  the  idea  that  President  Madero  should  follow  a 
policy  of  reform. 

LAISSER  FAIRE 

The  lack  of  definite  ideas  relative  to  the  present  situation  in 
Mexico  as  well  as  in  the  tlnited  States  and  other  foreign  countries 
and  the  difficulty  of  fixing  upon  a  practical  way  of  solving  the 
problem  are  due  to  the  fact  that  a  very  quick  solution  has  been 
looked  for. 

Any  attempt  to  solve  that  problem  by  hasty  means,  seeking  an 
immediate  change  of  government  and  the  immediate  establishment 
of  peace,  is  apt  to  give  merely  temporal  and  fictitious  results. 


i6 

The  first  thing  to  do  is  to  impress  the  public  mind  with  the 
idea  that  the  present  revolution  in  Mexico  is  really  a  social,  political 
and  economic  revolution,  and,  as  such,  requires  for  its  accomplish- 
ment a  certain  lapse  of  time  and,  perhaps,  further  sacrifices  of 
life  which,  while  painful  to  contemplate,  are  nevertheless  necessary. 

A  social  revolution  has  the  same  characteristics  that  certain 
cyclic  diseases  have  among  men.  It  is  necessary  and  inevitable  to 
wait  for  their  full  development,  and  any  attempt  to  prematurely 
interrupt  or  check  them  will  bring  about  very  dangerous  compli- 
cations. 


Washington,  D.  C.,  December  1st,  19/5. 


PUBLISHED  BY  THE 

CONFIDENTIAL  AGENCY 

OF  THE 

CONSTITUTIONALIST  GOVERNMENT 
OF  MEXICO 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 


TV  NORRIS-PETERS  CO..  W.*i««ioo.  D.  C. 


